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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

;UCHAEL W. McBRIDE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 16650

TERRY LYNNE JONES (formerly
known as Terry Lynne McBride)
Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
'I'his is an action brought by Defendant for modification
of the final Decree of Divorce entered in Civil No. D-24327
to award Defendant a share in assets of the marriage or the
proceeds derived therefrom which were concealed by Plaintiff
prior to and during the course of the divorce proceeding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment which was based upon two arguments set forth in
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of his Hotion, (1) Plaintiff did not in fact commit any fraud or misrepresentation
and the information given by Plaintiff to Defendant concerning the real property in question was truthful and accurate;
and (2) even if Plaintiff's representations with respect to
Land and Cattle Funding, Inc., were fraudulent or misrepresentations, that said representations constitu1e intrinsic fraud
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and therefore

the Court has no jurisdiction to reopen the

cause of action between the parties after the final Decree
of Divorce was entered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the
lower court reversed, vacating the Summary Judgment granted
to Defendant, and to have the case remanded for trial to the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were husband and wife and the
parents of six minor children when a Decree of Divorce in
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah was
entered on the 13th day of January, 1977.

Said decree was

final upon being signed by the Judge and filed with the
Clerk of the Court.

Ia the Decree of Divorce the Court

provided for all aspects incidental to the severance of a
marriage including specifically, property division as follows:
"6.
The following properties are awarded to
the Defenaant [wife]:
a.
24 acres of land in Alpine, Utah to be
located in the southern most part.
b.
Household furnishings presently in the
residence at 809 Edgehill, Salt Lake City, Utah
with the exception of the desk and chair which
shall be awarded to the Defendant; and
c.

The 1976 GMC truck.

7.
The following properties are awarded to the
Plaintiff [husband]:
a.
The residence at 809 Edgehill, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
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Utah.

b.

23 and 3/lOths acres of land in Alpine,

c.

Shoshone Associates Partnership Interests.

d.

Stock in land and cattle funding and

e.

1976 Porsche (TR30).

On February 15, 1979, Defendant filed a petition for an
Order :o Show Cause specifically petitioning the Court to
equitably divide assets of the marriage alleged by Defendant
to have been undisclosed by Plaintiff at the time of the
divorce proceeding. The Petition makes specific reference to
5,000 acres of real property located in the northern part of
Utah and southern part of Salt Lake County.

Said petition is

supported by the affidavit of Defendant stating (1) it was
represented by Plaintiff during the course of the divorce
proceedings that all properties of the marriage were listed
in the stipulation or in the family trust and that said
properties were all the properties owned by the parties and,
(2) Plaintiff had failed to disclose all of his assets
including specifically an interest owned by Plaintiff in
5,000 acres of land located near Alpine, Utah and that
Defendant believed she was entitled to 1/2 of said real
property or the proceeds therefrom.

(TR 36-37).

In 1979 the 5,000 acres were sold for $7.5 million.
The issue herein involves the question of whether Plaintiff
adequately disclosed his ownership interest in the property
at the time of the divorce.
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It is not disputed by the parties that in 1973 there
was a limited partnership formed by the name of Alpine
Limited.

The general partner in that limited partnership

was a general partnership known as Geodyne II.

Plaintiff

owned one-third of Geodyne II; Geodyne I I owned approximately
one-half of Alpine Limited.

Alpine Limited owned some 5,000

acres of land located at approximately the boundary between
Salt Lake County and Utah County.

Thus. Plaintiff effectively

owned an approximate 16% interest in the profits and/or losses
of Alpine Limited.

In May of 1973 Plaintiff apparently soM

a 6% interest in the right to receive the net profits of
Alpine Limited for

~25,000.00

leaving him with a 10% interest
(TR 209-211)

in the assets of Alpine Limited.

About 13 months after the divorce the assets of Alpine
Limited were purchased for ~7.S million dollars (TR 215).
In answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and at Defendant':
deposition Defendant stated that Plaintiff had made representations prior to the divorce to her that his interest in an
(TR 69,

investment known as Alpine Limited was worthless.
246, 259, 262-264, 269-270, 309-311).

Plaintiff claims however, that in 1974 he contributed
all of his interest in the net profits of Alpine Limited to
an Idaho corporation known as Land and Cattle Funding, Inc.
.

.

1

He further claims that his contribution was va ue

d

a

t

"125
~

'

ooo.i

Plaintiff alleges that by the fall of 1975 Land and Cattle
Funding, Inc. lost everything and at the time of the divorce
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in December of 1976 tne corporation was worthless.

(';.'R

109-

llO, 210-212).

Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he owned
100% of the stock of Land and Cattle Funding, Inc. at the
time the corporation ceased doing business, that he has
personally paid some $30,000.00 of the liabilities of Land
and Cattle Funding, Inc. and that he intends to pay an
additional $20,000.00 of the debts of this corporation and
as sole snareholder he is entitled to any proceeds derived
from the assets of Land and Cattle Funding, Inc. which consist of the aforementioned interest in Alpine Limited and the
name Land and Cattle Funding, Inc.

(McBride deposition pp.

35-38, 46-50).

It is tne position of Plaintiff McBride that:

(a) his

statements and representations to Defendant were true to
the effect that the family interest in Alpine Limited was
worthless;

(b)

that even if the information supplied by

Plaintiff to Defendant concerning the assets of the marriage
was inaccurate and/or fraudulent that Defendant did not
rely on said statements and representations, and (c) if
nis statements and representations were fraudulent that
inasmuch as che statements were made in December 1976 and
a final Decree of Divorce was entered in January 1977 that
any fraud perpetra-r.eu by Plaintiff is to be characterized
as intrinsic fraud rather than extrinsic fraud and that
according to case law a judgment may not be overturned be-
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cause of intrinsic fraud.
It is Defendant's position that (1) Defendant had
presented an issue of fact which precluded the entry
of summary judgment on the issues before the court;

(2)

that in fact Plaintiff McBride had never placed the
Alpine Limited asset into the corporation or that if he
had actually contributed this asset to the corporation he
had misrepresented the value of the Land and Cattle
Inc. at the time of the divorce.

Fundi~,

(See TR 109-110); (3) that

Plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment
of assets constitute extrinsic fraud which may be the basis
for

set~ing

aside a final judgment; and,

(4)

the fiduciary

relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant required full
disclosure and entitled Defendant as the spouse in the
weaker position to rely upon the representations of the
party with superior knowledge.
ISSUE
The district court erred in finding that extrinsic
fraud could not possibly have been committed by Plaintiff on
Defendant in misrepresenting the value of the assets of the
marriage and in concealing assets of the marriage from Defendan:
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER OR
i>lOT PLAINTIFF MADE A FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION TO DEFENDANT.
Although Plaintiff contends that he contributed his
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.

interests in Alpine Limited to a corporation called Land and
cattle Funding Inc., it is important to point out that
Defendant has never admitted that such a transfer in fact
took place.

Whether the Alpine Limited interests belonged

to Land and Cattle Funding Inc., a corporation owned entirely
by Plaintiff or whether the interest was owned by Plaintiff

directly makes little difference. Either Plaintiff McBride
never placed the Alpine Limited asset in the corporation
Land and Cattle Funding, Inc., and thereby concealed that
asset from Defendant or if he did contribute the asset to
the corporation he misrepresented the value of the corporation to Defendant.

The point of Defendant's claim is that

this interest in whatever form was represented to Defendant
by Plaintiff as being worthless and Defendant has produced

evidence to support the proposition that the property did
indeed have value in 1973, in 1975 and in 1978.
It is admitted by the parties that in 1973 an interest
in Alpine Limited equalling less than half of the property
was sold for $200,000.00 ~lus an agreement to pay all contract balances.

(McBride depo. pp. 7-d).

This supports

Defendant's contention that the entire Alpine Limited interest was worth approximately $3,000,000.00 in 1975. Likewise
it is uncontested that in 1978 the property was purchased for

$7,soo,ooo.oo

and Plaintiff McBride will receive 10% of that

sale. 1
1Alµine Limited did not receive
.
$7.5 mi·11·ion. Approximately
$L.5 million is or way to be paid to Plaintiff as a sales
commission.
Defendant's claim relates only to the amount
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
received by AlpineLibrary
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Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Plaintiff produced no evidence of the value of the property
as of the time when the divorce was granted.

As the party

moving for surrunary judgment he has the burden of taking all
the evidence before the Court, considering it in a light
most favorable to Defendant and proving that the

represent~

tions made by him to Defendant at the time of the divorce
proceeding and prior thereto were truthful and accurate.
Defendant has no duty to present evidence as to this value
until the time of trial.

Defendant has failed by affidavit

or other sworn averment to controvent the allegations in
sworn averments submitted by Defendant in support of her
petition.
Summary judgment for Defendant as granted by the lower
court was improper and contrary to Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. and
the

large body of opinion supplementing that rule.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case, Sandberg vs. Klein,

576 P.2d 291,

(Utah 1978) stated:

"A surrunary judgment can only be granted under
Rule 56(c), u.R.C.P., when it is shown there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment, as a matter
of law under the operative facts. The Court
cannot' consider the weight of testimony or th7
credibility of witnesses in considering a motio~
for surrunary judgmept. Herein although th~ parties
were not in complete conflict as to certain facts,
the understanding, intention, and consequences of
those facts were vigorously disputed. These
1.
matters can only be resolved by a trial. Pg. 29
In the case of Holbrook co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191
(Utah 1975) this Court held:
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"It only takes one sworn statement under
oath to dispute the averments on the other side of
the contr~versy and create an issue of fact. . • .
If there is any dispute as to any issue, material
to the settlement of the controversy, the summary
Judgment should not be granted. Pg. 193.
In the instant matter Plaintiff has submitted by Affidavit
(TR 36-37) by Answers to Interrogatories (TR 68-71, 114-121,
and by Deposition (TR. 246, 259, 262-264, 269-270, and 309311) sworn averments disputing the issues and allegations
raised by Plaintiff.

Defendant has averred under oath that

she relied upon statements made to her during the course of
marriage and also communications between counsel all setting
forth as a fact the negative net worth financial condition
of Alpine Liwited.

Defendant submits that in such a situation

tne lower court could not find as a matter of law that no
extrinsic fraud could have been committed by Plaintiff.
(The issues of extrinsic v. intrinsic fraud will be discussed supra).
In light of the foregoing, Defendant submits that the
Court holding in western Pacific Transport Co. v. Beehive State
Agricultural Co-op, No. 16056 (Utah, filed June 26, 1979)
states the applicable law with respect to this case.
"We are entirely cognizant of the advantages of
the summary judgment procedure in saving the time,
effort and expense of trial when it clearly
appears that there are no disputed issues of
material facts and the Court can therefore move
for the moving parties as a matter ~f law 7
However, the granting of such a motion fails of
that objective and hoped for advantages are not
only lost, but there actually results a greater
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e~panditu~e of time and effort if there are such
disputed i~sue~ to be resolved and the granting f
such a motion is ~ot justified. From what has be~
set forth above, it should be plain that in this
case ~here are such disputed issues which ought to
be ~ried.
The motion was improperly granted and
it is necessary that the case be remanded for
trial. Cost to Appellant (Defendant).

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
AND CONCEALMENT OF ASSETS PRIOR TO THE DIVORCE
PROCEEDING CONSTITUTE EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
Plaintiff's position as set forth in pleadings to the
lower court is that the divorce decree entered by the court
January 13, 1977 can be modified only if the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations of Plaintiff constitute extrinsic
fraud rather than intrinsic fraud.

Defendant, contends that

a statement contained in the correspondence from James A.
Murphy, counsel for Plaintiff to Joseph L. Henriod, counsel
for Defendant, dated December 6, 1976:
"Stock in Land and Cattle Funding. At this
time the corporation is in very poor condition and
has a negative net worth".
could only constitute extrinsic fraud, namely in so responding to Defendant's request for information regarding assets,
made tnrough her counsel, Plaintiff's counsel responded witl
the above quoted statement which constitutes

misrepresen~

tion and extrinsic fraud in that either the Alpine Limited
interest was not contributed to Land and Cattle Funding, Inc.,
and thereby concealed or if it was contributed the value of
the corporation was misrepresented.
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It is clear that said alleged misrepresentation consists
of a statement in a letter exchanged between counsel and
that it it not perjured testimony or a false answer to an
interrogatory. Nevertheless Plaintiff claims said misrepresentation constitutes intrinsic fraud and as such is insufficient
to enable this Court to set aside the divorce decree.
careful examination of the case law setting forth
elements of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud shows that that
alleged misrepresentation contained in correspondence between
counsel constitutes extrinsic fraud and there is no question
but that the representations made by Plaintiff to Defendant
during the course of the marriage concerning said asset
constitute extrinsic fraud.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Haner v. Haner,
13 u.2d 299, 373 P.2d 577,

(1962), Plaintiff appealed from

an order denying her motion to set aside or modify a divorce
decree which had been granted to Defendant.

The court

stated that:
"In order to justify granting relief the alleged wrong would
have to be of the type characterized as extrinsic fraud:"

The Court then defined "extrinsic fraud" as:
"Fraud based on conduct or activities outside of
the court proceedings themselves; which.is depriving the other party of the op~ortunity to
present his claim or defense. This type of fraud
which is regarded as a fraud not only upon the
opponent, but upon the court itself, can be .
accomplished in a number of ways, such as making
false statements or representations to the other
party or to witnesses to prevent them from con-
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~esting the issues; or by that means or
preventing the attendance of parties or
or.by d~stroying or secreting evidence;
fair trial of the issues is effectively
373 P.2d at 578, 579.

otherwise
witnesses
so that a
prevented.

This is precisely the issue presented to the c our t b y Defendan:
in her petition.

Defendant has specifically alleged that

Plaintiff made false statements to her and that through his
counsel he made a false representation to her counsel concern·
ing the value of an asset with the intent to prevent her
from examining that asset more closely in order to secrete
an asset

whic~

should have been divided between the parties.

In Haner the court found that the Defendant had "admitted
that accusations in his pleadings and at that trial . . .
were not true .

II

(373 P.2d at 579). The court held that

"Inasmuch as the parties and their witnesses were
present and these issues were contested during the
trial, if there were in fact mis representations
and fraud,
. they would have occurred within
the trial itself (thus intrinsic to it) and therefore would not have been of the type of fraud
characterized as extrinsic fraud explained above.
(emphasis added). 373 P.2d at 579.
The question of the value of the asset of the marriage
in Alpine Limited was not contested during the trial specifica:
because of the representations which constitute the basis
for Defendant's petition.

It is clear that the alleged

fraudulent misrepresentations are based on conduct outside
of the court proceeding itself.

Plaintiff in this case

fraudulently prevented the matter of settlement of the
·
t
parties interes

· a 11 of Plai· nti' ff' s assets to be contested
in

and prevented Defendant from the opportunity to make a
to the concealed assets.
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cla~

In Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298, 121 Utah 362 (1952)
the Plaintiff brought an action seeking to modify a prior
divorce decree on the basis that due to the misrepresentations
and conduct of the Defendant certain real property was not
included in the property settlement.

Plaintiff claimed that

the Defendant "fraudulently and deceitfully prevented the
matter of settlement of the parties property rights to come
before the Court

" 242 P.2d at 299.

In defining extrinsic fraud

in Glover the Utah Supreme

court quoted A.L.R. Annotation, Vol. 113, p. 235 as follows:
"Extrinsic fraud must consist of some act ulterior
to the merits of the proceedings out of which the
the judgment arose, by which the party attacking
the judgment was prevented from presenting his
case of was induced not to present it. Such fraud
consists of something done by the successful party
preventing the adverse party from presenting all
of his case to the court, so that there was, in
fact, no adversary trial or decision of the issue
in that case.
242 P.2d at 299.
The court then quoted Vol. 88 A.L.R. p. 1201 which
states in pertinent part:
[I]n the case of extrinsic fraud, relief is
granted on the theory that such fraud has prevented the unsuccessful party from fully presenting his case, and hence that there has never
been a real contest before the court on the subJ ect matter of this suit. 242 P.2d at 300.
In Glover, the Plaintiff did not bring t~e property to
the Court's attention because of her reliance upon a private
agreement which as it later turned out, Defendant had no intention of keeping.

The court then quoted the leading

United States supreme court case of United States v. Throckmorton,
% 11.S.

61,

25 L.Ed 93,
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"Where ~~e.u~successful party has been presented
from e~nibiting fully his case, by fraud or
~ece~t~on practiced on him by his opponent . . ,
in similar cases which show that there has never
been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case, .are reasons for which a new suit may be
sustained to set aside and anull the former
judment or decree and open the case for a new and
fair hearing. 242 P.2d at 300.
based on the foregoing the Court in Glover found that the
misrepresentations of the Defendant constituted extrinsic
fraud.
The Utah Supreme Court in Clissold v. Clissold, 519
P.2d 242

(Utah 1974) defined extrinsic fraud as "those

actions asserted to be fraudulent which prevent a fair
submission of the controversy .

II

The Court defined

intrinsic fraud as "conduct asserted to be fraudulent which
occurs during the course of the proceedings . . . " 519 P.2d
at 242.
The Court in Clissold was careful to point out that
"exceptions [to the rule requiring extrinsic fraud]

exist ~

divorce cases where there has been a gross misrepresentation
of assets by a party." 519 P.2d at 242.
It is clear that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations of Plaintiff Michael McBride occurred outside of any
court or other adversary hearing or proceeding. Certain
assets were concealed from Defendant prior to preparation of
the stipulation and hence she was deprived of the opportuniey
to contest her interest in such concealed assets.

The

·
t t ·
re clearly extrinsic.
alleged fraudulent misrepresen a ions a
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POINT III
THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE REQUIRES FULL DISCLOSURE AND ENTITLES THE
SPOUSE IN THE WEAKER POSITION TO RELY UPON THE
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PARTY WITH SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE.
The rule of law is f irmlv established in Utah that a
husband who is in a suoerior and stronaer Position to have
knowledae of the assets of the marriaae has a fiduciarv dutv
to fullv and fairlv disclose this information to his wife.
In Glover su0ra. the court held
"Plaintiff [was entitled tol an OPPOrtunitv to
invoke the oowers of a court of aeneral iuris
diction to include within a Prior divorce decree
the orooertv riahts of the oarties. normallv
included therein. but omitted in this case because
of the alleaed fraud of the defendant. As stated
in Peterson v. Budae. 35 Utah 596. 102 Pac. 211.
215: "there is no rule of law more fullv established than that which holds that transactions
between oersons occuovina fiduciarv or confidential
relations with each other. in which the stronaer
or superior oartv obtains an advantaae over the
other. cannot be uoheld." 242 P.2d at 300.
In Palmer v. Palmer. 26 Utah 31. 72 Pac. 3 (1903). the
Utah Suoreme Court found that the husband had kept his wife
in ianorance of the value and amounts received as Proceeds
from certain orooertv and that the execution of the seJaration
aareement bv the wife would not be bindina UPOn her because
it had been obtained throuah unfair advantaae and unwarranted
coersion.
A review of the record on aooeal shows that Plaintiff
keot Defendant misinformed and uninformed concernina the assets
of the marriage and his business dealings.

(See Jones Deposi-

tion, TR 309-311).
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Speaking of the fiduciary duty owed by a husband to his
wife in that case the Supreme Court stated:
"Not only the law, but a man's most sacred
honor, as well as every principal of justice and
equity demands that he treat his wife at all
times, and under all circumstances, respectfully
fairly, and openly . . . . [the husband] had no '
right to conceal himself or anything relating to
their affairs from her. 26 Utah at 48, 49.
CONCLUSION
Defendant-Appellant submits that based upon the sworn
averments, evidence, and argument presented to the lower court
it was improper for the court to rule as a matter of law
eitner that all representations made by Plaintiff to Defendant prior to and during the divorce proceedings were

acc~a~

and truthful or that there was no extrinsic fraud committed
by Plaintiff in making misrepresentations as to the existence
or value of assets of the marriage to Defendant prior to and
during the divorce proceeding.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~

day of

~

1979.

h L. Henriod
Ear Jay Peck
Stephen L. Henriod
NIELSEN, HENRI OD, GOTTFREDSON
400 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of Appellant's Brief, on the~ day of November,
1979, postage prepaid to the following:

Mr. Raymond J. Etcheverry
BERMAN & GIAUQUE
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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